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• Suppose penalties for first-time offenders are restricted.
• It is then typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders.
• Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed.
• Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced?
• If the restriction was strong, then overdeterrence should actually be amplified!
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a b s t r a c t
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter
repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense,
but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties
for first-time offenders is relaxed; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overde-
terrence of repeat offenders now be reduced?We show that this is the case only if the original restriction
was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat offenders should actually be further amplified.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The law often sanctions repeat offenders more severely
than first-time offenders.1 The literature has provided various
justifications for the fact that the sanction imposed on an of-
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, University of Cologne,
Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany. Tel.: +49 221 470 5609; fax: +49 221
470 5077.
E-mail addresses: daniel.mueller@uni-bonn.de (D. Müller),
patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de (P.W. Schmitz).
1 For example, with regard to civil penalties in USA, Shavell (2004, Chapter 22)
points out that for certain violations of the Occupational Safety andHealth Act there
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.010
0165-1765/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access artic
0/).fender depends on whether he was convicted previously.2 Some
authors have argued that a record of prior offenses provides in-
formation about the offender’s characteristics (e.g., a higher-than-
average propensity to commit crimes).3 Yet, making sanctions
depend on offense history may be advantageous even when indi-
viduals are ex-ante identical such that there are no characteristics
to be learned about. As emphasized by Shavell (2004, p. 529), when
is a maximum fine of $7000 for a first offense, while a repeat offender may be fined
$70,000.
2 See Miceli (2013) for a recent literature review.
3 See e.g. Rubinstein (1980), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), and Chu et al. (2000).
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but also a higher sanction for a future violation, an individual will
be deterred more from committing a violation presently’’. In this
paper, we follow Shavell’s (2004) insight and further explore how
penalties for repeat offenders should be designed when we take
their effect on the deterrence of first-time offenders into account.
Specifically, suppose that there is an exogenously given
restriction on the penalties for first-time offenders; i.e., there is
an upper limit l which a fine for a first-time offender must not
exceed, while there is no (binding) restriction on the fine that a
repeat offender has to pay.4 In each of two periods, a potential
offender engages in an activity that may cause a harm h. When a
harm is caused, the offender is convicted to pay a fine. If the harm is
smaller than the maximum fine l, then by setting the fine equal to
the harm h in both periods the negative externality of the activity is
internalized and the first-best (i.e., socially optimal) activity level
is implemented. Yet, if l < h, then first-time offenders in the first
period are underdeterred, given that the fine for repeat offenders
is set equal to the harm h. As a consequence, in general it will
be optimal for the lawmaker to set the fine for repeat offenders
larger than h. While in the second period overdeterrence of repeat
offenders is ex-post inefficient, the advantage of such a policy is
that the large fine for a second offense has a spillover effect on the
first period.5 Individuals in the first period are deterred not only by
the (restricted) fine that they have to pay when they cause harm
as a first-time offender, but also by the prospect of having to pay a
large fine as a repeat offender in the second period.
Let us now explore what happens when the restriction l that
society has put on the admissible fines for first-time offenders is
relaxed. At first sight, one might guess that the lawmaker should
reduce the ex-post inefficient overdeterrence of repeat offenders,
because the deterrence of first-time offenders can now be im-
proved by a larger penalty for first offenses. Yet, it turns out that
this is the case only if initially the upper limit lwas not very restric-
tive. If l was very small, then an increase in l will actually prompt
the lawmaker to further increase the fine for repeat offenders;
i.e., overdeterrence of second offenses will be further aggravated.
Intuitively, when l is very small, then a first-time offender in the
second period faces only a very small fine, which provides indirect
incentives in the first period not to cause a harm. Now consider
an increase in l, such that a first-time offender in the second period
can bemore severely punished.When the fine for a repeat offender
does not go up, then the indirect incentives in the first period
are reduced, which the lawmaker may prefer to offset by further
increasing the fine for repeat offenders.6
2. The model
In each of two consecutive periods, t = 1, 2, a risk-neutral
individual chooses the level at ∈ [0, 1] of a potentially harmful
4 There may be various reasons why society does not accept larger penalties for
first-time offenders. For instance, Stigler (1970, p. 528) has pointed out that a ‘‘first-
time offender may have committed the offense almost accidentally’’ and Polinsky
and Shavell (1998, p. 313) argue that ‘‘considerations of fairness might constrain
the sanction imposed on first-time offenders but not on repeat offenders’’.
5 Note that related spillover-of-incentives effects also occur in sequential moral
hazard models with limited liability. See e.g. Schmitz (2005) and Ohlendorf and
Schmitz (2012), who show how second-period rents may act as carrot and stick for
an agent’s first-period effort choice, such that optimal contracts exhibit memory
even though the periods are technologically independent. Recent papers that
exploit related effects include e.g. Kräkel and Schöttner (2010), Tsai and Kung
(2011), Chen and Chiu (2013), and Pi (2014).
6 This argument holds provided that the direct punishment in the first period is
still rather small, which is the case for relatively small values of the upper limit l.activity. With probability at the individual causes a harm h > 0 in
period t .7 For simplicity, assume that whenever a harm is caused,
the individual is convicted to pay a fine.8 The individual’s private
benefit from pursuing the activity is b(a) : [0, 1] → R with
b′(a) > 0, b′′(a) < 0, lima→0 b′(a) = ∞ and lima→1 b′(a) = 0.
Let y ∈ {0, 1} denote the individual’s offense history at the
beginning of period t = 2. If y = 1, then the individual is pre-
convicted because he caused a harm h in period t = 1. If y = 0, the
individual has a clean slate. In period t = 0 the lawmaker commits
to a constitution, in particular stipulating the (finite) fine Ft ≥ 0
to be paid by an individual in period t if he causes a harm. While
the fine in period t = 2 may condition on the individual’s offense
history, F2 = F2(y), the lawmaker is not allowed to discriminate
according to whether a first offense was committed in t = 1 or
t = 2.9 Thus, F1 = F2(0) ≡ F 0 and F2(1) ≡ F 1. Moreover, while
there is no (binding) restriction regarding the punishment F 1 of a
repeat offender, by social convention punishment of a first-time
offender must not be overly drastic, F 0 ≤ l, where l ≥ 0.
If the activity level in each period were directly enforceable,
then the lawmaker would implement the activity levels that
maximize the expected social surplus S(a1)+ S(a2), where
S(at) = b(at)− h · at . (1)
Thus, the first-best solution is given by a1 = a2 = aFB > 0, where
aFB is implicitly characterized by b′(aFB) = h.
3. The analysis
In period t = 2, an individual with offense history y ∈
{0, 1} chooses the activity level a2(F y) = argmaxa2∈[0,1] U(a2; F y),
where
U(a; F) = b(a)− F · a (2)
denotes an individual’s expected utility from activity level awhen
facing fine F in case of a harm. The second-period activity level that
is optimal for the individual satisfies
b′(a2(F y)) = F y (3)
with da2(F y)/dF y = 1/b′′(a2(F y)) < 0; i.e., the higher the fine, the
lower the individual’s optimal activity level. Note that U(a; h) =
S(a), hence a2(F y) ≥ aFB if and only if F y ≤ h. Application of the
envelope theorem reveals that the individual’s expected second-
period utility is decreasing in the second-period fine, dU(a2(F y);
F y)/dF y = −a2(F y).
In period t = 1, the individual chooses his activity level a1 ∈
[0, 1] in order to maximize his overall expected utility,
EU(a1) = U(a1; F 0)+ a1 · U(a2(F 1); F 1)
+ (1− a1) · U(a2(F 0); F 0), (4)
which is strictly concave, d2EU(a1)/d(a1)2 = b′′(a1) < 0. In
consequence, if dEU(a1)/da1
a1=1 = −F 0 + U(a2(F 1); F 1) −
U(a2(F 0); F 0) > 0, then the optimal first-period activity level is
7 It is straightforward to generalize the model to the case in which a may be
larger than 1, provided that the probability p(a) with which a harm is caused is
strictly convex. When p(a) is strictly concave, in general the problem is no longer
well-behaved; yet, one can construct examples with a ∈ [0,∞) such that our main
insights still hold. Hence, the upper bound on a is not crucial.
8 Throughout, we suppose that the individual has sufficient wealth to pay the
fine.
9 Qualitatively similar results hold in the case in which a first-time offender may
face different fines in the two periods and there is an exogenous restriction on fines
in the first period only.
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a1=1 ≤ 0, the optimal first-period
activity level is characterized by the first-order condition
b′(a1(F 0, F 1)) = F 0 + U(a2(F 0); F 0)− U(a2(F 1); F 1). (5)
In the latter case, application of the envelope theorem yields that
the individual’s activity level is strictly decreasing in both the
fine for first-time offenders and the fine for repeat offenders,
∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 0 = (1 − a2(F 0))/b′′(a1(F 0, F 1)) < 0 and ∂a1(F 0,
F 1)/∂F 1 = a2(F 1)/b′′(a1(F 0, F 1)) < 0.
Anticipating the individual’s behavior, the lawmaker’s problem
at date t = 0 amounts to setting fines F 0 ≤ l and F 1 in order to
maximize the expected welfare
W (F 0, F 1) := S(a1(F 0, F 1))+ a1(F 0, F 1) · S(a2(F 1))
+ (1− a1(F 0, F 1)) · S(a2(F 0)). (6)
Making use of (3) and (5), the partial derivatives of the expected
welfare are given by
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 0
= ∂a1(F
0, F 1)
∂F 0

(F 0 − h)(1− a2(F 0))
+ (F 1 − h)a2(F 1)

+ (1− a1(F 0, F 1)) · [F 0 − h] · da2(F
0)
dF 0
(7)
and
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
= ∂a1(F
0, F 1)
∂F 1

(F 0 − h)(1− a2(F 0))
+ (F 1 − h)a2(F 1)

+ a1(F 0, F 1) · [F 1 − h] · da2(F
1)
dF 1
. (8)
We now characterize the penalties F 0
∗
and F 1
∗
that the
lawmaker will stipulate at date t = 0.
Proposition 1. If l ≥ h, the lawmaker sets F 0∗ = F 1∗ = h.
When the lawmaker sets F 0 = F 1 = h, then in the second
period the individual will exert the socially desirable activity level
a2(h) = aFB irrespective of his offense history. Since his second-
period utility does not depend on his offense history, according to
(5) the individual’s first-period activity level is purely determined
by the fine F 0 = h for first-time offenders, so the individual
chooses the socially desirable activity level also in the first period,
a1(h, h) = aFB.
Now consider the case in which the restriction on penalties for
first-time offenders becomes relevant. We first establish that re-
peat offenders are punished at least as hard as first-time offenders;
i.e., decreasing punishment schemes are never optimal.
Lemma 1. If l < h, the lawmaker sets F 0∗ ≤ F 1∗ .
Note that harsher punishment of repeat offenders implies that
U(a2(F 0); F 0) ≥ U(a2(F 1); F 1). Hence, the individual’s first-period
activity is characterized by (5), such that ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F y < 0 for
y ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, with lima→1 b′(a) = 0, U(a; F) is bounded
from above, such that lima→0 b′(a) = ∞ implies that a1(F 0, F 1) >
0 must hold.
Next, Lemma 1, (7), and (8) imply that whenever 0 < l < h,
optimal sentencing requires F 1
∗
> h and thus overdeterrence of
repeat offenders, i.e., a2(F 1
∗
) < aFB. The prospect of a larger fineFig. 1. The optimal fine for repeat offenders, F 1∗ , and the optimal fine for first-time
offenders, F 0
∗
, as functions of the maximum penalty for first-time offenders, l.
that the individual may have to pay in the future helps to deter
him from choosing an overly large activity level in the present.10
Proposition 2. (i) If l ∈ (0, h), the lawmaker sets F 1∗ > h.
(ii) If l = 0, she sets F 1∗ = h.
Finally, observe that the lawmaker optimally imposes maxi-
mum punishment for first-time offenders.
Proposition 3. If l < h, the lawmaker sets F 0∗ = l.
In what follows, assume that there is a unique interior solution
regarding the choice of F 1. Under the optimal punishment scheme,
there is a non-monotonic relationship between the maximum
punishment of first-time offenders and the optimal punishment of
repeat offenders.
Corollary 1. There exist l and l with 0 < l < l < h, such that
dF1
∗
dl

l<l
> 0 and dF
1∗
dl

l>l
< 0.
Thus, for sufficiently large values of l, a relaxation of the
restriction on penalties for first-time offenders prompts the law-
maker to reduce the overdeterrence of repeat offenders, since sat-
isfactory incentives in the first period can now be provided by
relatively large fines for first-time offenders. However, for small
values of l, when society accepts an increase in the penalties for
first-time offenders, then the lawmaker optimally reacts by also
increasing the penalties for repeat offenders, thus aggravating
overdeterrence. This policy allows the lawmaker to uphold the de-
sirable indirect effect that large fines for repeat offenders have for
the incentives of first-time offenders in the first period. Our main
results are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.11
10 Note that if l = 0, the indirect effect of the second-period prospects on the
first-period incentives is already strong enough such that the lawmaker prefers not
to make use of overdeterrence of repeat offenders. Intuitively, one might think that
when l = 0, then increasing F 1 above h should be welfare-improving. After all, in
the second period there would only be a second-order loss given that y = 1 (and
no effect given y = 0), while in the first period there would be a first-order gain.
Yet, this reasoning neglects the fact that y = 0 (leading to a smaller second-period
welfare than y = 1) becomes more likely when F 1 is increased (and hence a1 is
reduced).
11 Specifically, in the figures b(a) = √a− a/2 and h = 1. Hence, aFB ≈ 0.11.
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∗
, F 1
∗
), while the second-period
activity level is a2(F 1
∗
) or a2(F 0
∗
), depending on whether or not the individual was
previously convicted.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed by contradiction. First, suppose
that F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1)) > U(a2(F 0)) + F 0 is optimal. Then
a1(F 0, F 1) = 1 and a2(F 1) > a2(F 0) > aFB because F 1 < F 0 ≤
l < h. Now consider an increase in the fine for repeat offenders to
F˜ 1 ∈ [F 1, F 0]. Clearly a2(F 0) is left unchanged and, as long as F˜ 1
is sufficiently close to F 1, also a1(F 0, F˜ 1) = a1(F 0, F 1) = 1. Since
a2(F 1) > a2(F˜1) > aFB, S(a2(F˜1)) > S(a2(F 1)), thereby strictly
increasing the value of the lawmaker’s objective. In consequence,
F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1)) > U(a2(F 0))+ F 0 cannot be optimal.
Next, suppose that F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1)) ≤ U(a2(F 0)) + F 0
is optimal. Since F 1 < F 0 ≤ l < h, we have aFB < a2(F 0) <
a2(F 1), S(a2(F 1)) < S(a2(F 0)), and U(a2(F 0), F 0) < U(a2(F 1), F 1).
Moreover, a1(F 0, F 1) is characterized by (5), ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0,
and a1(F 0, F 1) > aFB because b′(a1(F 0, F 1)) = F 0+U(a2(F 0), F 0)−
U(a2(F 1), F 1) < F 0 < h. In consequence, a slight increase in F 1
increases overall expected total surplus,
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
=
<0 for a1(F0,F1)>aFB  
∂S(a1(F 0, F 1))
∂a1
·∂a1(F
0, F 1)
∂F 1
+ ∂a1(F
0, F 1)
∂F 1

S(a2(F 1))− S(a2(F 0))

+ a1(F 0, F 1) · dS(a2(F
1))
da2  
<0 for a2(F1)>aFB
·da2(F
1)
dF 1
> 0, (9)
contradicting the original choice of fines to be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From Lemma 1, in the optimum we
must have F 0 ≤ F 1. Distinguishing four different cases, we proceed
by contradiction.First, suppose that F 0 ∈ (0, l] and F 1 ∈ [F 0, h] is optimal. With
0 < F 0 ≤ F 1, we have a1(F 0, F 1) ∈ (0, 1), ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0,
a2(F 0) ∈ (0, 1), and a2(F 1) ∈ (0, 1). Then
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
=
<0  
∂a1(F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
 <0  
(F 0 − h)
>0  
(1− a2(F 0))
+
≤0  
(F 1 − h)
>0  
a2(F 1)
+ a1(F 0, F 1)  
>0
· [F 1 − h]  
≤0
· da2(F
1)
dF 1  
<0
> 0, (10)
which contradicts F 0 ∈ (0, l] and F 1 ∈ [F 0, h] to be optimal.
Second, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 ∈ (0, h) is optimal. With
0 = F 0 < F 1, we have a1(F 0, F 1) ∈ (0, 1), ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0,
a2(F 0) = 1, and a2(F 1) ∈ (0, 1). Then
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
=
<0  
(F 1 − h)
 <0  
∂a1(F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
·
>0  
a2(F 1)
+
>0  
a1(F 0, F 1) ·
<0  
da2(F 1)
dF 1

> 0, (11)
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 ∈ (0, h] to be optimal.
Third, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 = 0 is optimal. In this case,
a1(F 0, F 1) = a2(F 0) = a2(F 1) = 1 and ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0.
Then
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
=
<0
−h
 <0  
∂a1(F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
+
<0  
da2(F 1)
dF 1

> 0, (12)
which contradicts F 0 = F 1 = 0 to be optimal.
Finally, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 = h is optimal. With 0 =
F 0 < F 1 = h, we have a1(F 0, F 1) ∈ (0, 1), ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0,
a2(F 0) = 1, and a2(F 1) ∈ (0, 1). While ∂W (F 0, F 1)/∂F 1 = 0, in
this case
∂W (F 0, F 1)
∂F 0
=
<0
−h ·
>0  
(1− a1(F 0, F 1)) ·
<0  
da2(F 0)
dF 0
> 0, (13)
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 = h to be optimal.
(ii) To see that F 1 = h is optimal for l = 0, note that a2(F 0) =
a2(0) = 1. From (8), we have
∂W (0, F 1)
∂F 1
= (F 1 − h)

∂a1(0, F 1)
∂F 1  
<0
· a2(F 1)  
>0
+ a1(0, F 1)  
>0
· da2(F
1)
dF 1  
<0

. (14)
Thedesired result then follows from the fact that ∂W (0, F 1)/∂F 1 >
0 for F 1 < h and ∂W (0, F 1)/∂F 1 < 0 for F 1 > h. 
Proof of Proposition 3. If l = 0, then F 0 = l = 0. In the remainder
of the proof, we consider l > 0.
First, with F 1 > h by Proposition 2, F 0 = 0 cannot be optimal
because in this case a2(F 0) = 1 and a1(F 0, F 1) < 1 such that
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∂F 1
= (F 1 − h)

∂a1(F 0, F 1)
∂F 1
· a2(F 1)
+ a1(F 0, F 1) · da2(F
1)
dF 1

< 0. (15)
Hence, overall expected total surplus could be increased by reduc-
ing F 1, which makes F 0 = 0 incompatible with optimality.
Next, suppose that 0 < F 0 < l is optimal, i.e., the constraint
F 0 ≤ l is not binding in the optimum. Then the optimal values of
F 0 and F 1 have to be characterized by the corresponding system of
first-order conditions, i.e., ∂W (F
0,F1)
∂F0
= 0 and ∂W (F0,F1)
∂F1
= 0 have to
be jointly satisfied. From (7) and (8), this requires
(1− a1(F 0, F 1)) · [F 0 − h] · da2(F0)dF0
∂a1(F0,F1)
∂F0
= a1(F
0, F 1) · [F 1 − h] · da2(F1)
dF1
∂a1(F0,F1)
∂F1
, (16)
where a1(F 0, F 1) ∈ (0, 1), and da2(F y)/dF y < 0 and ∂a1(F 0, F 1)/
∂F y < 0 for F y ∈ {F 0, F 1}. With F 0 < l < h by hypothesis, a
necessary condition for (16) to hold is that F 1 < h. According to
Proposition 2, however, F 1 < h cannot be optimal, which contra-
dicts F 0 < l to be optimal. 
Proof of Corollary 1. With F 0∗ = l the optimal fine for repeat
offenders is characterized by
∂W (l, F 1
∗
)
∂F 1
= ∂a1(l, F
1∗)
∂F 1
[(l− h)(1− a2(l))
+ (F 1∗ − h)a2(F 1∗)

+ a1(l, F 1∗) · [F 1∗ − h] · da2(F
1∗)
dF 1
= 0. (17)
Implicit differentiation of (17) with respect to l yields
∂2W (l, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
· dF
1∗
dl
+ ∂
2a1(l, F 1
∗
)
∂F 1∂F 0

(l− h)(1− a2(l))+ (F 1∗ − h)a2(F 1∗)

+ ∂a1(l, F
1∗)
∂F 1

(1− a2(l))− da2(l)dF 0 (l− h)

+ ∂a1(l, F
1∗)
∂F 0
(F 1
∗ − h)da2(F
1∗)
dF 1
= 0. (18)
For l = 0 we have a2(0) = 1 and F 1∗ = h such that (18) becomes
∂2W (0, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
· dF
1∗
dl
+ ∂a1(0, F
1∗)
∂F 1
· da2(0)
dF 0
· h = 0. (19)
Likewise, for l = hwe have F 1∗ = h such that (18) becomes∂2W (h, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
· dF
1∗
dl
+ (1− a2(h)) · ∂a1(h, F
1∗)
∂F 1
= 0. (20)
Finally, note that
∂2W (l, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
= ∂
2a1(l, F 1
∗
)
∂F 1∂F 1

(l− h)(1− a2(l))
+ (F 1∗ − h)a2(F 1∗)

+ ∂a1(l, F
1∗)
∂F 1

∂a2(F 1
∗
)
∂F 1
(F 1
∗ − h)+ a2(F 1∗)

+ ∂a1(l, F
1∗)
∂F 1
(F 1
∗ − h) ∂a2(F
1∗)
∂F 1
+ a1(l, F 1∗) ∂a2(F
1∗)
∂F 1
+ a1(l, F 1∗)(F 1∗ − h)d
2a2(F 1
∗
)
dF 1dF 1
(21)
such that
∂2W (0, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
= ∂a1(0, F
1∗)
∂F 1
a2(F 1
∗
)+ a1(0, F 1∗)da2(F
1∗)
dF 1
< 0
(22)
and
∂2W (h, F 1
∗
)
∂(F 1)2
= ∂a1(h, F
1∗)
∂F 1
a2(F 1
∗
)+ a1(h, F 1∗)da2(F
1∗)
dF 1
< 0.
(23)
Combining (19) and (22) reveals that dF 1
∗
/dl|l=0 > 0. Likewise,
combining (20) and (23) yields dF 1
∗
/dl|l=h < 0. The results stated
in the corollary then follow from continuity. 
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